The impact of cross-border mergers on co-decisionmaking process: The case of a Danish company by Rocha, Robson
  
   
Department of Business 
and Politics 
Steen Blichers Vej 22 
      DK-2000 Frederiksberg  
      Tel. +45 3815 3585 
      Fax. +45 3815 3555 
      e-mail dbp@cbs.dk 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The impact of cross-border mergers on co-decisionmaking 
process: the case of a Danish company 
Robson Rocha, PhD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
 in
 B
us
in
es
s 
an
d 
Po
lit
ic
s 
   
 
   W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
  N
o.
 5
8.
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working paper no 58, 2008 
Editor: Lars Bo Kaspersen 
 
Department of Business and Politics 
Copenhagen Business School 
Steen Blichers Vej 22 
DK-2000 Frederiksberg 
Phone: +45 3815 3585 
E-mail: dbp@cbp.cbs 
www.cbs.dk/dbp 
 
 
 
ISBN 87-91690-69-2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The impact of cross-border mergers on co-decision-
making process: the case of a Danish company 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robson Rocha, PhD 
Assistant Professor 
International Center for Business and Politics 
Working paper 
2008 
 
 
  
 2
The impact of cross-border mergers on co-decision-
making process: the case of a Danish company 
 
Abstract 
 
The present article investigates changes over time in the patterns of co-decision-
making in a Danish multinational company which has grown through cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions. The findings show the difficulties that trade union 
representatives face when firms try to introduce a governance regime based on 
shareholder value ideology. The article argues that hybrid forms of governance are 
unlikely to develop due to historically embedded governance institutions, which 
create distinct expectations about how a firm must be governed and who has the right 
to participate in this governance. The spread of the Anglo-Saxon model of governance 
in Europe is likely to have negative effects on co-decision-making processes and 
established patterns of organizational cooperation.  
 
Key words: multinational corporations, mergers and acquisitions, co-decision making, 
institutions, corporate governance.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the past several decades, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have become the 
most prevalent form of growth and internationalization strategies for multinational 
companies (MNCs) all over the world. During the 1990s, the total number of 
corporate takeovers between companies of different national origins grew more than 
six-fold (Kang and Johansson, 2000), the largest proportion of cross-border M&As 
having taken place among European countries (OECD, 2003: 158n). These new forms 
of growth and internationalizing are likely to affect established relations between 
management and workers in the companies that are acquiring and being acquired. 
However, the consequences for co-decision-making in M&As have not been studied 
from an institutional perspective, and this requires greater research effort (Shimizu et 
al., 2004: 348).  
 
 
Patterns of decision-making have taken a number of different directions, progressing 
at different paces according to institutional environments and specific national paths. 
Due to the increasing number of cross-border M&As among multinational 
corporations (MNCs), the encounter between different national traditions of employee 
influence in organizational decision-making is becoming more common than ever. 
These encounters develop into complex social processes, since a multiplicity of actors 
with different national backgrounds is involved in coordinating and controlling 
multinational companies (Morgan, 2001).  
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Most research on M&As has examined this phenomenon in the context of national 
M&As, all of which involve changes in which conflict, tension, and power struggles 
are typical and expected. However, few studies have considered M&As in a cross-
border perspective or for the possible impacts on decision-making processes. Cross-
border M&As have been studied from a cross-cultural perspective in a business 
setting in which control mechanisms need to be negotiated between the different 
actors involved (Gertsen et al., 1998). Olie (1994) pointed that the degree of 
compatibility of administrative practices, management styles, organizational 
structures or organizational culture are important factors for successful integration in 
mergers and acquisitions. Kristensen and Zeitlin (2005), in their extensive study, have 
demonstrated the problematic nature of mergers and acquisitions because actors who 
have learned to play strategic games in their own local and national contexts need to 
deal with actors from other parts of the world where different rules prevail.  
 
The present article does not focus on the cultural dimensions of or cultural integration 
into M&As, but on how institutional heritage, or, as they have been called, different 
nationally bounded administrative heritages (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Calori et al., 
1997), might affect established patterns of co-decision-making. The aim of this article 
is therefore to investigate changes in co-decision-making processes when companies 
with different institutional heritages merger and how these changes may have 
implications for other organizational areas. The article seeks to answer the following 
questions: How do established patterns of decision-making evolve in a company 
resulting from cross-border M&As? If changes in decision-making processes take 
place, which other organizational areas are affected?  
 
In order to investigate changes in co-decision-making in MNCs, the article focuses on 
one particular case that has not often been studied, namely a Danish family-owned 
MNC which in recent decades has grown through processes of merger and acquisition 
between companies originally from Denmark, Germany and the US. In the process it 
has decided to introduce an American-inspired governance model, selecting American 
managers for top management positions and moving its headquarters to the US. 
 
The article shows how the introduction of a new, more top–down and centralized 
process for decision-making negatively affects established patterns of cooperation 
between managers and workers’ representatives, and how these changes in turn affect 
the flow of information among different organizational levels and the politics of skills 
development within the firm. It is argued that the introduction of a new governance 
model based on shareholder value ideology affects established patterns of co-
decision-making 
 
The article is organized as follow. First, it presents the institutional differences 
between liberal market economies and co-ordinated market economies which are 
thought to impact on the governance of firms, established patterns of co-decision-
making and the politics of skills formation. The governance models, industrial 
relations systems and structures of vocational and training systems (VET) in different 
institutional environments are briefly discussed. Secondly, the methodology of the 
research is presented. Then the focus turns to the specific case study, including the 
history of the merger, and identifying which organizational areas are affected by co-
decision-making. It is shown that a firm’s strategy and politics of skill formation and 
its efforts to improve the employability of employees are quite interdependent areas. 
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The empirical material is presented in two different organizational phases, before and 
after the merger. By dividing the empirical material in this way, it will be shown how 
changes in decision-making processes affect organizational interdependencies 
between co-decision-making and the politics of skills formation. Finally, the findings 
are discussed. 
 
Danish and American business systems and co-decision-
making processes. 
 
The analysis below uses the historical neo-institutionalist approach, which treats 
social actors as acting within a framework of embedded economic relations, 
influenced by a particular set of national institutional arrangements. Institutional 
arrangements can both constrain and enable action by erecting barriers but also 
creating opportunities for the development of employee influence in decision-making. 
Institutional arrangements as reflected in national legislation, the nature of property 
rights, and the nature of educational and vocational systems shape the boundaries and 
possible paths for legitimate action. National institutions create the ‘rules of the game’ 
by which individuals and organizations operate, cooperate and compete. They forge 
the ways in which organizations come into existence and develop (North, 1990). 
Institutions generate shared, collective understandings or rules of conduct reflected in 
laws, governance mechanisms and the functioning of financial markets (North,1990; 
Scott, 2001), which help to define observed patterns of market exchange (Fligstein 
1996). 
 
Governance systems and channels of co-decision-making are forged by a 
configuration of institutions involved in industrial relations, training systems, state 
interventions and financial intermediation (Whitley, 1999). Thus, governance models 
present features − strengths and weaknesses − that are related to the institutions in 
which they are embedded. The understanding of governance models in this article is 
based on the stakeholder approach, which is more common among economic 
sociologists. Corporate governance focuses on an “entire network of formal and 
informal relations which determines how control is exercised within corporations and 
how the risks and returns are distributed between various stakeholders” (Lane, 2003: 
82).  
 
The dominant practices of firms in relation to governance models, co-decision-
making, work systems, reward systems and employee relations complement each 
other, thus forming distinctive national configurations (Whitley 1999). As firms are 
created and grow in specific institutional environments, during the process of 
internationalization they will bring with them the institutional distinctiveness of their 
home environments, or what Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) and Calori et al. (1997) have 
called the ‘nationally-bounded administrative heritage’. As a result, MNCs need to 
coordinate and control relations in a variety of institutional environments which are 
composed of a multiplicity of embedded actors, taking with them experiences and 
taken-for-granted assumptions, as well as cognitive frameworks originating in 
distinctive institutional environments. According to this line of argument, success in 
transferring and integrating practices of control and coordination is influenced by the 
degree of institutional similarity between a firm’s home country and its subsidiary’s 
host country (Kostova, 1999).  
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There is considerable evidence of this ‘country of origin’ effect on multinational 
corporations (Edwards and Ferner, 2002). The education and training of managers and 
representatives in their home countries is one of the most important institutional 
factors informing the behaviour of MNCs. Linked to the formation and training of 
managers are the governance models that different societies have developed (Whitley, 
1999).  
 
The countries involved in the M&As in this case are Denmark and the US. Denmark 
is an example of a co-ordinated market economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001), where, 
among other features, participation in decision-making has been an important 
component of national industrial regimes. Although it has liberal labour-market 
characteristics such as a low level of employment security, the Danish business 
system is typified by a strong trade-union movement and a tradition of co-operation 
between labour-market actors (Madsen, 2006). In Denmark an agreement establishing 
co-operation committees was established as early as 1947 by the labour movement 
and the private employers’ associations. Even in highly Tayloristic industries, which 
historically have been characterized by strongly adversarial relations, Danish 
companies are moving towards greater co-operation and trust between management 
and labour (see Hasle and Møller, 2007: 425). 
 
The Danish system of industrial relations is characterised by a high rate of 
unionization, which currently involves eighty percent of the workforce. There is a 
single channel for the representation of employees’ interests through trade unions, 
which responds to sectoral-level collective bargaining and almost monopolizes 
representation in the workplace. At this level, the shop stewards represent the workers 
who belong to their trade unions, and a convenor elected from among all shop 
stewards represents the whole workforce on the company board. Representatives have 
the legal right to seat on the board and have easy access to top management. By 
having a seat in the co-operation committees, they are able to influence corporate 
strategy and development (Kristensen, 2003). 
 
An important feature of the Danish industrial-relations system is its “flexicurity” 
model. The Danish ‘flexicurity’ system has been characterized as combining labour-
market flexibility and social security (Madsen, 2006). An important feature of this 
system is argued to be employers’ ability to hire and fire employees easily. However, 
an important, if not the most important effect of the ‘flexicurity’ system in recent 
years has been workers’ ability to upgrade their skills through continuous training, not 
only during periods of unemployment, but also at different stages in their working 
careers. What employees expect from their employers is support to upgrade skills 
which can be applied in current or future jobs. Danish trade unions are strongly 
involved in the governance of vocational and further training institutions (Kristensen 
and Rocha, 2007), which need to be co-ordinated locally by networks among the 
convenors and shop stewards of different firms, who in this way become important 
gatekeepers of the flexicurity system. Vocational education and training (VET) in 
Denmark is formed by network of organizations, with connections at different levels, 
where goals and means are continually being negotiated, and receiving inputs from a 
myriad of workplaces, trade unions and employer associations. The Minister of 
Education determines the guidelines for each VET program based on the 
recommendations of these groups, who are able to analyze labor market trends and 
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recommending new programs and changes to existing ones (Winterton, 2007).  The 
flow of information and negotiation for setting aims and means are fundamental to the 
well-functioning of the system, which relies on collaboration and inputs from 
different societal levels.  
 
The US, which is characterized as a liberal market economy (LME), has a strong anti-
union tradition and a weak tendency for the participation of the workforce in decision-
making. The literature points to several examples of American MNCs attempting to 
transfer their anti-union policies to their subsidiaries abroad (Muller, 1998; Ferner et 
al., 2005). In Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Norway and Austria, employees have 
legal rights to board-level representation in private firms. Symmetrically, employees 
in all Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom 
and United States) have no constitutional rights, and no statutory or tripartite 
regulation for co-determination. 
 
The US model of corporate governance assumes norms of self-interest, opportunism 
and enforced compliance (Lubatkin et al., 2005: 883). Increasing shareholder value is 
an important driver of senior management decision-making in American companies 
(Froud et al., 2000). The US model has been characterized as having an ‘outsider’ 
ownership structure, in which large firms are mainly owned by private or institutional 
portfolio investors, with little active interest in the day-to-day management of the 
firm. The ‘shareholder value’ model of capitalism emphasizes the primacy of the 
interests of shareholders over other stakeholders within the enterprise.  
 
American managers of publicly quoted corporations are inclined to maximize the net 
present value of the assets under their control. The proportion of profits made by 
American firms which is distributed to shareholders in the form of dividends and 
share buy-backs rose from an average of just under 50 percent in the 1960s and 1970s 
to around 70 percent in the 1980s and 1990s (O’Sullivan, 2000). The continuous 
waves of restructuring in firms guided by the ideology of American shareholder value 
prompted Froud et al. (2000) to predict that “late capitalism restructuring is likely to 
be a negative process for labour with transitory gains for capital” (ibid.: 795).  
 
Higher-quality forms of training like apprenticeships are more prevalent in CMEs 
than LMEs. Apprenticeship is most extensive in CMEs, where it occupies 5 to 6 
percent of civilian employees as against just 0.3 percent in the USA (Elbaum and 
Singh, 1995). In the US, many of the most disadvantaged workers receive little or no 
training at all. At the same time, pressures to maximize short-term results and the few 
institutional constraints on exits among economic actors discourage long-term 
investments in technology and training. Many US companies are avowedly anti-
union, many pursue a ‘three-lane low road’ of low trust, low skills, and low wages 
(Milkman, 1998). A race to the bottom, based on low wages and poor working 
conditions, is more likely to occur here. 
 
Other characteristics of American MNCs include the centralization, standardization 
and formalization of HR policy (Child et al., 2000). Clark and Almond (2006) argue 
that American firms are less tolerant of institutional constraints, even more so than in 
other LMEs. On the other hand, American firms make more frequent and significant 
changes to their strategies, structures and practices than companies originating in so-
called ‘co-ordinated market economies’ (CMEs) (Edwards et al., 2005; Hall and 
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Soskice, 2001). This feature would facilitate American firms introducing the 
characteristics of a foreign model, and along with this, the hybridization of different 
governance models (Pieterse, 1994). 
 
Due to the clear differences between the institutional environments involved, the 
expectation was that managers and labour representatives in Denmark were likely to 
face problems in creating coherent relationships among the different organizational 
levels and actors involved. However, the potential for reverse diffusion (Edwards et 
al., 2005) also exists, i.e. in the American company learning and adapting some 
governance features from the Danish company. A third possibility, a hybrid (Pieterse, 
1994) form of governance, could also emerge, in which practices developed in one 
institutional environment are transferred to another and both experience adaptation 
through their recombination with home-country governance practices (ibid.: 165). 
Based on a longitudinal and in-depth case study, the article presents evidence that 
hybrid forms of corporate governance are difficult to produce due to historically 
embedded institutions which create distinct expectations about how a firm must be 
controlled and who has the right to exert this control.  
 
  
 
Research Methods  
 
The interest of this research was on the phenomenon of cross-border mergers and its 
implications for decision-making processes. The research approach was case study-
based. The example here involves an in-depth case study, covering a period of three 
years. It describes the experience and determines the extent to which existing theories 
help us understand such cases or require modification (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007). The case-study methodology is useful in developing a processual and holistic 
approach (Elias, 1978) which fits well with neo-institutional theory. Case studies 
permit a deep exploration of how the institutional contexts in which MNCs are 
embedded impact on the way they are controlled and coordinated (Edwards et al., 
2007). 
 
Data Collection  
 
Data was collected using three techniques: (1) semi-structured, one-to-one interviews, 
(2) semi-structured group discussions (3) written and electronic documentation, and 
(4) non-participant observation. Interviews were the main source of data, with the 
observation and documentation data serving as important triangulation and 
supplementary sources for understanding the phenomena. 
 
The informants were chosen according to guidelines for “purposeful sampling” 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985) using a “snowball or chain sampling” strategy. In other 
words, the author chose informants who would be most able to inform on the main 
research question concerning changes in decision-making processes over time. Past 
research and current research focuses suggested that sampling should begin with 
managers and shop stewards because they are key actors in the organizational 
decision-making process. During the interviews, each informant was asked for his or 
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her recommendations as to who could best explicate the processes of interest. The 
research process involved an iterative process of collecting data, analyzing them, and 
looking for new informants on the basis of information considered important during 
the previous interviews. This strategy has made it possible continually to improve 
both the focus of the research and the quality of the data being collected. 
 
The company was visited several times during the three-year period, and the research 
design was divided into three phases.1 During the first phase, workers, representatives 
and managers from different departments and hierarchical levels were interviewed. 
The interviews were semi-structured, and the intention was to provide an overview of 
current organizational processes. During the second phase, one week of very intense 
fieldwork was carried out in the company, with workers, top and middle managers, 
HR consultants, shop stewards and the convenor being interviewed. This was 
important in strengthening the validity of the conclusions through the use of multiple 
sources of information, including interviewing managers and workers from different 
levels and departments, which also helped to perform triangulation in the data 
analysis. Several interviewees were interviewed more than once during the different 
phases of the project. This approach was used to acquire a deeper understanding of the 
social processes in the factory and to obtain additional focused data to inform, extend, 
and refine emerging analytical themes.  During the days the author spent in the 
company, hours were used both to collect and to analyze the data in a continuous 
attempt to acquire a comprehensive view of the phenomena, also returning to the 
interviewees and asking for further explanation, or testing the researcher’s own 
understandings.  
 
Observations at the shop-floor level were also carried out and interviews conducted 
whenever possible. The company was prepared to provide access to documents 
related to investment in training, salary grades and even the firm’s confidential 
strategies. It also supplied some quantitative data and statistics, which improved 
knowledge of the socio-demographic characteristics of the employees. In a third 
phase, the author returned to the company twice and presented the analysis, which 
was discussed with the groups involved in the research. During this phase, the 
research participants were given an opportunity to comment on the data analysis, 
which provided another check on validity. 
 
 
The number of interviews in the different phases can be seen in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Semi-structured interviews 
 
Semi-structured interviews were used to provide as broad a scope as possible for the 
data collection. Interviews lasted 35-90 minutes. The initial interview procedure was 
                                                
1 This article is based on data collected as a part of a larger research project investigating organizational 
changes in firms located in Denmark. 
 9
mostly standardized across informants. These initial interviews involved questions 
about personal trajectory at the company, thoughts about the company's historical 
evolution, changes in work organization, the decision-making process, possibilities 
for upgrading skills, and the involvement of representatives at different organizational 
levels. As knowledge about the company increased and themes emerged in the data, 
interviews became progressively more structured. This progressive focusing of the 
interviews allowed patterns of interaction across informants and consistencies and 
inconsistencies across different organizational levels to be identified. 
 
Data Analysis  
The case analysis was based in grounded theory methods, in which theoretical 
concepts and propositions emerge as the researcher gathers data and investigates 
phenomena. In order to discover patterns, grounded theory method uses constant 
comparisons and its related open and axial coding techniques: the assignment of 
themes and concepts to a selected unit such as sentences taken from interviews, field 
notes and observations. The selected concepts are analyzed and combined in the 
search to uncover categories, while links between different categories need to be 
identified and confirmed against the data. The final step attempts to integrate the 
categories into a theory which accounts for the phenomenon being investigated.  
 
The collected data were coded and categorized in order to facilitate abstraction and 
theory construction. Coding proceeded primarily on two levels: 1) using a word list of 
concrete terms grounded in the data (partnership, participation, lean, Americans, 
Danes, cooperation, control, teams, decision-making process, trade unions, etc.); 2) 
using a word list of more abstract terms (governance, centralization, decentralization, 
short term, shareholder value, country of origin, stake-holders, etc.) arising from 
terms found in the literature (Eisenhardt, 1989). During axial coding, the author 
developed further conceptual domains by comparing themes within and between 
transcripts (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). 
 
Analysis took place at different points in time: while collecting data, when returning 
home, and while back to the field. The construction of patterns, discovery of 
consistencies, attempts to integrate distinct categories, abstracting from the data, and 
construction of theory were guided by theory as it emerged. Data was constantly 
compared across informants and over time (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) as integral parts 
of the grounded-research process.  
 
The case  
The company under investigation is one of the largest Danish companies and is 
considered very influential nationally, impacting on a great number of other local 
companies by virtue of its national legitimacy and great economic success. The case 
study provides a unique opportunity to investigate the organizational changes in 
decision-making processes from a longitudinal perspective under the complex 
conditions of a cross-border merger.  
 
During the 1990s, this Danish company (DC) started a process of multiple 
acquisitions. In 1998 the hydraulic division of the company was split from the mother 
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company and became an independent firm (D), which merged with a German 
company, forming GD. Currently GD is listed on the New York and Frankfurt stock 
exchanges. Two shareholders, the mother Danish company and the mother German 
company, own 38.5% each of GD stocks. After the merger the headquarters was 
transferred to Chicago, and a top managerial team chosen to manage GD was formed, 
mostly consisting of Americans who had previously been employed at the American 
acquisition. The merger itself produced a succession of mutually beneficial marketing 
advantages for both companies, boosting sales in Europe and enabling the firm to 
establish a large and important share of the American market. The number of 
employees at the Danish site grew from 700 in 2000 to its current level of 2400 
employees in 2006. Some features of GD are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 1. Number of interviews in the different phases  
Insert Tab. 1 
 
Table 2. GD profile 
 
Findings: the two phases in the development of the 
case study 
 
 
In this section, the case study is presented. It shows the conflicting views of American 
managers and Danish representatives about the decision-making process and how 
these differences impact on other organizational areas.  First, it shows the links 
between co-decision-making, information flow across different organizational levels 
and the politics of skills formation in the Danish site. Then, I discuss changes in the 
characteristics of co-decision-making when an American management team takes 
over and sets aside previous patterns of collaboration and co-decision-making, and 
how these changes affected previous politics of skills formation. 
 
As a form for organizing and presenting the data, the data are divided into two main 
phases, before and after the merger, but the focus is on how managers and workers’ 
representatives negotiated at these different moments, and how the patterns of 
interaction has changed over the time. The section shows how changes in co-decision-
making were perceived by the different organizational actors.  
 
Co-decision-making and the politics of skill formation  
 
The factory has been under pressure to improve its production processes. It has been 
struggling with two models: mass production and flexible specialization. These two 
different ways of organizing production processes can be seen side by side in the 
factory. Highly Taylorised lines are integrated with highly flexible workshops in 
complex ways. Blue-collar jobs can range from being quite repetitive to highly 
flexible. The continuous upgrading of skills thus becomes an important factor for 
moving from the first to the second category, especially as the more repetitive jobs 
have continually been replaced by the use of new technologies. Thus, continuous 
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upgrading of skills has become an important mechanism for increasing employability 
in the factory, as well as in the local labour market. 
 
Teams were considered a key element in the organizational landscape. In order to 
participate in this team organization, the skills development of all members was an 
important focus for management. It has been accepted in recent years that workers 
who are stimulated by their tasks are more likely to co-operate and to contribute to 
achieving organizational goals than those who are not. The contributions that workers 
can make to improve the performance of teams and to generate and share knowledge 
within a community of teams must be coordinated, as they have fundamental 
importance for HPWS: 
 
“We cannot have workers who leave their brains at the front door. We use a number 
of new concepts which are based on participation. Workers need to solve problems, 
and they should not ask for help all the time. In the past, unskilled workers could not 
touch a tool, it was forbidden. Now they must solve problems. When they cannot, at 
least they need to be able to understand and explain what kind of problem the 
machine presents.” (line supervisor) 
 
The continuous upgrading of skills has thus become quite a central issue for both 
workers and management. Workers need to upgrade their skills in order to improve 
their employability. The company needs flexible workers who can optimize its 
production processes. This is done by participating in courses offered by the company 
and by local vocational institutions.  
 
Our data indicate that special and skilled workers repeatedly asked for courses that 
were closely related to their jobs, as well as ones which could improve their 
employability in the labour market.  
 
“I have attended many courses, all kinds. I started here seven years ago, and I knew 
nothing about factories. Now, I have attended several CNC courses, I can operate 
most of the machines in my department, and I’m asking my representative to help me 
to find new courses. You cannot stop, you know; you must be prepared – the future is 
uncertain….” (special worker) 
 
Workers made use of the local training institutions with the support of the company. 
Their intention was to enhance their employability, so that they would be able to 
perform a large number of tasks related horizontally and vertically to their skills and 
jobs. 
 
In such a system, it is not surprising that skills development becomes an extremely 
important issue at the negotiating table between workers and management. It is not 
always possible to reconcile the different demands about which types of skills are 
going to benefit the company, the workers, or both. Because of their knowledge about 
how the vocational system can be used and transformed to serve local ambitions and 
needs, shop stewards become fundamental actors in negotiating with managers over 
which courses are more suitable in providing skills upgrading and consequently more 
organizational flexibility and enhanced employability for workers. The knowledge 
that such representatives accumulate over the years is used to make contact with the 
vocational training institutions in order to create courses that enable employees to 
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adapt to present and future working-life situations, job specifications, or career 
ambitions. At the same time, they also need to help companies improve their 
capabilities, since they negotiate courses which can support the requirements and 
ambitions or both firms and workers. As one representative explained: 
  
“When the company started talking about lean production, nobody knew what it was 
all about, then I asked my colleagues from other companies about lean, then I could 
learn about their experiences with lean. I used my contacts with the local vocational 
centre to design the courses necessary for our workers together with them.”  
 
By showing support for employee development, the company is likely to retain and 
attract the best workers locally, at the same time avoiding an image that they are 
preventing workers from making the best possible use of supporting welfare 
institutions. As one supervisor explained:  
 
“Highly engaged special workers can not only solve small maintenance problems, 
they can also anticipate many others, thus saving a lot of time and resources…. Many 
of these engaged workers are rewarded not only with higher salaries, but also with 
more courses…”.  
 
 
The politics of co-decision-making  
 
Recognizing that representatives strengthen the links between the work force and 
vocational institutions, managers welcome representatives and convenors as 
participants in strategy construction and its continuous re-definition. By participating 
in strategy construction and linking it to their experiences at the shop-floor level, 
representatives and convenors become fundamental partners with management in the 
evolution of and changes in the firm. As one middle manager explained: 
 
“We have good relationships; we are always trying to find out a solution which can 
benefit both sides. This is not always possible, but it works like a bank account. You 
know, everybody needs to put something there. This time I need a favour from them, 
next time they will need something from me…and in this way we keep things going on. 
Many times this involves a high level of compromise.”  
 
The organization is diverse, engaged in conflicts of interest and immersed in 
ambiguity. The picture it provides is not one of harmony among different working 
groups, but of actors trying to build an organization which is striving to attain and 
retain mutual recognition. For these groups, recognizing their diversity of interest 
helps to create flexibility in an environment which requires frequent modifications or 
changes to formal organizational structures and management practices. One shop 
steward remarked of his relationship with his supervisor: 
 
“It was not that easy in the beginning when I was elected a shop steward. Our 
supervisor is an old fashioned guy, we had many fights, but the truth is we are 
partners now, we understand each other and we respect each other. We sometimes 
make agreements that go beyond what people would accept as…let’s say, reasonable, 
but it is working now….” 
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Co-decision-making takes place at two different organizational levels. At the shop-
floor level, representatives and middle managers work together to improve production 
processes, negotiating the conditions of changes and solving the practical problems 
which continually emerge and impact on working conditions. In order to attend to the 
needs of the company while at the same time fulfilling the ambitions of the work 
force, the convener needs to be able to influence the company’s strategy. This is made 
possible by participating at the advisory board level. The link between the different 
levels is effected by the convener, who is also responsible for dealing with local 
training institutions in order to create new courses and even new educational 
programmes to suit the ambitions of the different actors. The convener, who 
represents all shop stewards, explained his position as follows when he was 
confronted with an organizational diagram: 
 
“My position in the hierarchy depends on the issue. Sometimes I need to be allied 
with top managers, sometimes with middle managers, always trying to find a 
balanced solution for all. Fortunately, I almost never need to challenge management 
with action. The door is always open for me at top management, and we know the 
strengths and weakness of each other. If we cannot achieve an agreement at the 
middle, I go to the top, if not there, I go to the board.” 
 
 
  
Second phase: introducing American-style management  
  
 
The merger took place in 2000, and soon afterwards the company’s HQ was 
transferred to Chicago. The Danish plant ceased to be part of the HQ of the Danish 
multinational, and became to the Americans just another subsidiary among many.  
However, during the three first years after the merger, the Danish site functioned 
independently from the HQ. 
 
“There was a lot of uncertainty after the merger, but we remained quite independent. 
The three years after the merger were quite intense, due to the great success of our 
products internationally, the great marketing synergy. Things started to change when 
the Americans arrived here. Before they were not only distant, but also invisible” (top 
manager).  
 
In 2003, two American vice-presidents were chosen to manage the Danish subsidiary 
and started building a new managerial structure for decision-making and 
implementing lean production concepts on the site. After the merger, and in part due 
to the increases in production, defects and the turnover rate among employees 
increased. In spite of this, the factory was able maintain a high level of quality, but 
only at the expense of increasing costs that could not be absorbed by increasing 
prices, as GD was contractually committed to reducing prices by 2% annually. To 
approach these problems with lean methodologies seemed obvious to GD: mass 
production allied with quality, standardization and flexibility. Indeed, elements were 
already integrated into the approach that was adopted. But where organizational 
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changes had always been a negotiated co-designing process in the Danish factories, 
the American top management team tried to change this, as we shall see below. 
  
Changing the Decision-Making Process 
 
In the past, an organizational change towards a new managerial model would have 
been negotiated at different organizational levels and with different work groups and 
their representatives. Despite a formerly strong partnership between the convenor and 
the CEO and a tradition of integrated bargaining, American managers were convinced 
that trade-union representatives in Denmark, as in any other country, would be solely 
preoccupied with employment, wages and working conditions. The survival of the 
company, its strategy and governance should not be on the agenda of trade-union 
representatives. They also assumed that a Danish company should be managed like an 
American company in the US. The big difference, according one of the American 
vice-presidents, was related to the overall change after the merger from ‘being the 
headquarters’ to ‘being just another subsidiary’ in a much bigger corporation. This 
caused a change in the levels at which decisions were made, and as result some people 
who formerly participated were no longer included. One of the American vice-
presidents expressed the changes in how trade-union representatives should be 
involved in the decision-making process as follows: 
 
“…a leadership group decides to move some production from Denmark to Poland. 
Before we go public with that, before we reach the final conclusion, it is our 
obligation to sit with the union’s people and talk about that, but to say that we need 
ask them and include their input in this strategy, it is not my understanding of the 
requirement…at the end of the day we are the ones who are going to make the 
decisions for the business”.  
 
This kind of argument was unacceptable to the convener:  
 
“I need to know which departments are going to be outsourced. I need to know in 
order to negotiate a solution for workers who are employed in those departments. I 
need to know not in order to prevent it happening, but to create alternatives that can 
benefit the company and its employees. But Americans do not know the difference 
between communication and information.”  
 
The information about new strategies became a formality, a way of dealing with the 
requirements of the law, not an organizational way to achieve a negotiated strategy.  
 
The Americans based their strategies on their own priorities, causing intense 
restructuring of the new organization. The methods used to evaluate different 
performances changed. The first feature of the lean system that was introduced was 
the just-in-time information system. This enabled top management to control the 
results of the daily operations better than before: the production flow, the number of 
quality problems, the levels of buffers, etc. A huge amount of hard data started 
flowing daily from the production floor to the top managers. The information flowing 
towards the top levels became impressive, and the number of reports increased 
exponentially. However, the information did not return from the top.  
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“… under the new system, managers are preoccupied with their own future. It is a 
quite individualistic way of doing things: people are not so much preoccupied with the 
common destiny of the company, [and] the effect is an organizational mess, each 
department following its own route, without much collaboration with other 
departments…” (factory manager) 
 
The resistance to accepting the new governance mechanisms in the factory was strong 
among Danish managers. One top Danish manager, with long experience of the US, 
stated that: 
 
“For a Dane to work in a American factory is like entering in a time machine. We go 
15 years back in time. Why should we like this? There is nothing to learn from them 
(Americans). They are lagging far behind us!”  
 
The negotiation of new organizational solutions was suppressed. Local managers and 
representatives both lost access to valuable information, and their ability to negotiate 
was continually being reduced. It became a strategy of divide and rule.  
 
There was a lot of talk about the expectations of the American managers in relation to 
how other organizational actors should support their ideas and strategies. As the 
convenor explained: 
 
“Americans love action, they need action all the time. We need to seat and discuss the 
implications of the whole process. They do not think I’m welcome to start questioning. 
Their expectation is that we support what they have decided. This is not the way 
things are done in Denmark.” 
 
As the American managers and the convenor could not agree what information they 
could share and what level of participation in the decision-making process the 
convenor should have, the collaboration between them started to deteriorate and 
totally disappeared after some months, turning instead into a very adversarial 
relationship. From the convenor’s side, the new top managers, who were mostly 
Americans, were either unable to understand the Danish systems of co-decision-
making, or unwilling to accept co-operation and participation at the higher 
organizational levels. As managers were reluctant to release the necessary 
information, even though this was against general agreements in Denmark, the 
alternative was to insist on the reinforcement of and obedience to the general 
agreement and the law.  
 
The American managers learnt how to interpret the Danish law and keep furnishing 
the information they considered necessary to the representatives, but they did not 
consider it necessary for convenors and shop stewards to be active participants in the 
development of general strategies. Both parties seemed to take their roles for granted, 
that is, the roles that each side is supposed to play in their own national systems of 
industrial relations. The Danish convenor assumed that he had the right to participate 
in the process of decision-making, even when the conditions changed from the Danish 
factory being the headquarters of a Danish multinational corporation to being just 
another part of a much larger multinational corporation. The American managers, on 
the other hand, simply transferred their interpretations of the possibilities for co-
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operation between labour and capital from the US to this local community in 
Denmark.  
 
Previous collaboration between shop stewards and Danish managers had avoided 
these tensions. The previous convenor argued that collaboration between managers 
and representatives had been working so well that he had made himself “unemployed” 
by decentralising most decisions to his representatives in the different departments. 
His job had become more focused on co-ordinating the work of the representatives, as 
well as on more central issues that affected the whole labour force in the firm’s local 
sites. As the decentralization of tasks to shop stewards was already functioning well 
when the new convenor was elected and the American team was appointed, the 
changes did not have serious consequences for partnerships at the shop-floor level, 
which continued to function well. 
 
In the new managerial model, information flowed much less across horizontal 
boundaries and instead from units to the top. This information was about magnitude 
and time, while the ‘soft’ information about processes, through which the earlier 
results had been achieved, ceased to flow. According to the Danes, the flow of 
information was not necessarily linked with communication and mutual 
understanding, as strategies from the higher levels were simply presented as 
information, not negotiated. Strategies at the shop-floor and middle levels, on the 
other hand, were negotiated, but not communicated to the top. Thus many new 
boundaries and filters in the organization were constructed, and systematic 
communication among work teams was weakened. A small group could form a team 
and become almost insulated from its surroundings. To a great extent, different work 
groups became independent of each other in the factory. Meeting short-term demands 
and deadlines became the preoccupation.  
 
Changes in the politics of skills formation 
 
The managerial team from Chicago started working on the idea of outsourcing some 
departments of the factories in Denmark. For this reason, they interpreted investment 
in human resources as a waste of time and resources, because several workers would 
soon cease to be employees of the company. One Danish top manager, who asked for 
an off-the-record interview, stated that the Americans had explicitly ordered that 
investment in human resources be slowed down, that employees were not to be seen 
as a priority for the development of the firm, and that blue-collar workers especially 
should be regarded as an easily discarded asset. From the American perspective, the 
previous way of upgrading skills seemed quite risky: why should a company help 
employees to develop skills which the company had no use for either currently or in 
the near future, and which could even help employees find new jobs in another 
company? 
 
As information from the top ceased to flow, the previous process of shared decision-
making went with it. The convenor lost his capacity to know in which direction the 
company was moving, and consequently he was unable to link the needs of the 
company to the needs of the workforce. Workers became confused about the future of 
the factory, with more speculation to go on than real information. As a result, workers 
were investing time and resources in following courses that could improve their 
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employability without necessarily benefiting the firm. The courses being supported 
were aimed to deliver the minimal requirements for lean production and lean 
techniques. The previous innovative practices still existed, but overall coordination 
was difficult to maintain. One production manager explained the situation as follows: 
 
“..the turnover rate is quite high now. The company has difficulties not only to retain 
but also to attract the employees that it needs. Our best employees and managers are 
trying to find new jobs elsewhere; the company is no longer an attractive workplace 
in the region.”   
 
New training for unskilled workers, aiming to train them as industrial operators, 
which had been very successful in other companies became a failure at GD, because 
GD was in a weak position to attract committed workers to attend the educational 
program. The education would take one and a half years, and the worker should spend 
several months in different departments of the company. However, workers no longer 
felt secure enough to commit themselves to the company for almost two years. One 
shop steward explained the situation as follows: 
 
“As the company could not attract workers, then the humans resources department 
started sending very new and unprepared workers. Thus, the training became 
something for problematic workers, previous unemployed people. The result was a 
total failure. Nobody wants to take that training anymore.” 
 
Discussion   
 
The case-study findings show that the hybridization of different forms of employee 
influence in decision-making was difficult to produce. Actors were operating in a 
complex net of institutional relations with quite different taken-for-granted 
assumptions about how a firm should be governed and who should benefit from this. 
Conflicting institutional legacies were clearly at play. Two different organizational 
dynamics in the same company were presented in the two different moments of the 
merger: before and after introduction of the “American management model”.  
 
In the first phase, an ongoing process of blurring boundaries among organizational 
and professional groups was taking place, implying a large number of new issues for 
the newly constituted organizational groups. Divisions that were more or less 
established became a matter of dispute, and strategies that seemed at face value 
demeaning for workers were defended by their representatives. Negotiations among 
actors was an important part of the organizational life in which actors could mutually 
influence each other’s choices and strategies.  
 
Workers continually upgraded skills and, as a result, changed the temporary nature of 
organizational roles, thus also affecting the boundaries between the different 
organizational groups. These boundaries became blurred and were continually being 
redefined, which in turn encouraged negotiation among different work groups and 
between themselves and their managers. The politics of skills formation and the 
negotiation of organizational change had become a multidimensional and 
interdependent process, one in which actors continually needed to redefine their roles 
and skills. The continuous transformation in the nature of skills that this process 
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engendered made the links between the firm and the training institutions fundamental 
for workers. 
 
Shop stewards and convenors represented a large variety of organizational groups and 
interests at different levels, both internally and externally; they were highly mobile 
and could cut across several organizational boundaries. As representatives engaged in 
negotiations at different organizational levels with different actors, new issues for 
negotiation continually emerged. This organizational mobility permitted them to gain 
access to and accumulate higher levels of information, which in turn reinforced their 
bargaining and persuasive power in the various organizational forums. Armed with 
this level of mobility and information, they had become able to create coalitions and 
partnerships and to negotiate with different actors, thus influencing organizational 
strategies and goals. 
 
The company was a clear example of a new organizational form in which actors 
needed to show a willingness to adjust their positions constantly, thus being able to 
adapt their strategies when persuasive counterarguments were presented. Managers 
and representatives continually needed to justify their own choices to each other and 
to the groups they represented. This seemed to be fundamental, since the roles of 
managers and convenors were not clearly defined. To be involved in the continuous 
processes of negotiation and participation, in which apparently contradictory choices 
must be justified, makes the life of managers and convenors more interdependent. 
 
If decisions are to be seen as being justified, employees need to view the decision-
making process as responsive to their concerns, especially in relation to health, 
security, education and distributional issues. This does not mean that hierarchy totally 
disappears from organizational life. “Co-decision-making” and “hierarchy” are 
overlapping organizational principles which constantly challenge each other in the 
search for mutually acceptable solutions to pressing problems (Kristensen and Rocha, 
2007).  But a “command and control” management style is hardly acceptable in 
Scandinavian countries (Larsen and Neergaard, 2007;  Isaksson, 2008).  
 
During the second phase, the American management team appealed to legality and 
efficiency as sources of justification (Kely, 2004), in so doing raising questions about 
the whole idea of how co-decision-making should function and why it should take 
place. The new governance model was more top-down and centralized than the 
previous one, and there was not so much space for negotiation. When the co-decision-
making was blocked at a higher level, although the systems as a whole did not 
collapse, the information flow and the deliberative processes became compromised to 
a great extent. 
 
Danish representatives expected much more attention to the concerns of all stake-
holders. As a result, the problematic areas drove the convenor to adopt a strongly 
adversarial position in his approach to top management. However, at the middle level 
the co-decision-making survived, with Danish managers becoming adversarial in 
relation to American managers while still maintaining their cooperative relations with 
the Danish representatives.  
 
These changes adversely affected the process of skills formation and upgrading, 
which was a fundamental issue for representatives and the labour force. The shop 
 19
steward was no longer able to influence how the strategies of the company and the 
ambitions of its labour force could be combined. Danish representatives expected 
greater access to information and more opportunities to influence strategies than top 
management were willing to provide. American managers expected support for 
managerial strategies without having to open the necessary channels for information 
and influence over the company’s strategy.  
 
In the present case, a hybridized form of governance could not emerge between the 
Danish and American models of employee participation in co-decision-making. Three 
areas of disagreement were fundamental in blocking the co-decision-making after the 
cross-border merger. First, there was incompatibility between the two governance 
regimes involved and the possibilities they engendered for the different actors to 
strategize. Americans were pursuing a centralized top-down model, which should be 
quick to change organizational processes. Danish representatives expect open 
channels to exist as a means of influencing decision-making processes. Secondly, the 
sources of legitimacy in decision-making moved from the development of the 
company and its work force in the long run towards the idea of creating shareholder 
value and ownerships rights. Thirdly, the industrial relations models involved affected 
how actors expected collaboration to function and how it affects the development of 
the local labour market. American managers in Denmark seemed constrained by the 
general US hostility towards unions and employee representation in MNCs (Ferner et 
al., 2005). 
 
The institutional analysis was intended to uncover the basis for strategic action, the 
different forms of governance and the different forms of justification. Therefore, 
based on the analysis of this case, it is possible to argue that hybrid forms of 
governance are rather difficult to make sustainable and that, when they do take place, 
they will be intrinsically unstable. The different forms of justification for decision-
making in different governance models are likely to produce strong incompatibilities, 
as the shareholder value ideology, which is so important for American management, 
is difficult to combine with the ‘stakeholder’ traditions of Scandinavian and other 
continental European countries. The different national industrial-relations traditions 
may also present incompatible features, like the resistance to trade unions that 
American companies share and attempt to export to their subsidiaries abroad.  
 
As mergers and acquisitions have become the most prevalent mode of 
internationalization, we can assume that the problems faced by managers and 
representatives in our case are also becoming quite widespread. Representatives may 
try in different ways to convince foreign companies about the possibilities and mutual 
benefits of cooperation and co-decision-making. However, workers also turned down 
representatives whom they felt had learned to cooperate with managers in ways that 
were too favourable to the latter. Representatives need to attend to the increasing 
demands of the workforce. Local managers, on the other hand, are continually being 
pressured to cope with the demands of their headquarters, which is constantly drawing 
up new measures and benchmarks for performance, and demanding the introduction 
of novel human resource-management practices, so that plant organization and 
governance are constantly in flux and under negotiation.  Thus, there are good reasons 
for anticipating that co-decision-making might always be unstable in this type of 
multinational corporation. 
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As Djelic and Quack (2003a,b) have suggested, ‘dominant foreign players’ may 
become ‘missionaries’ of institutional change by trying to export their own national 
models, thus possibly being able to institutionalize their own national rules in foreign  
contexts. If this is the case, the spread of a ‘shareholder’ value ideology among 
continental European countries may have adverse consequences for established 
patterns of co-decision-making processes. Another possibility is that American 
companies could learn the advantages of the Continental European model, which 
supports the stronger involvement of workers in strategy construction.  
It is also possible that in the long run both local management and trade unions may 
seek to expand their international networks and deploy international comparisons to 
influence organizational change and restructuring, or indeed seek European-level 
accommodations on some issues which reach across borders by using mechanisms as 
European works councils (Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2006; Brewster et al.,2007; 
Huzzard and Docherty,2005). These are interesting hypotheses which need a 
longitudinal research design which would focus on learning and bargaining processes 
in mergers and acquisitions, but these processes did not take place under the time span 
of research in which this article is based. 
 
This article has pointed out an important area of research which needs further 
investigation: the dichotomy between home and host countries in a environment 
populated by companies that are the result of cross-border mergers and acquisitions, 
where the Anglo-Saxon governance model is considered by many firms to be the most 
adequate to support the internationalization process. On the one hand, the growing 
internationalization of American companies can be expected to impact strongly on 
established national patterns of co-decision-making due to incompatibilities between 
different industrial traditions and different management models. On the other hand, 
the increasing tensions between the different actors involved may generate new 
patterns of action among trade unions and their representatives, as the nature of 
national business systems has an impact on how actors perceive and accept the level 
of influence that they and the other actors have the right to pursue. A reaction within 
Scandinavian trade-union movements may also be expected to change the balance of 
power between multinational companies and local actors. Therefore, in the long run, 
local actors may also be expected to re-establish their previous ways of co-operating 
and influencing a firm’s behaviour.   
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Tab. I 
 First 
Phase 
Number 
of 
interviews 
Second 
Phase 
Number 
of 
interviews
Third 
Phase 
Number of 
interviews 
Top 
managers 
1 1 4 6 2 2 
Middle 
Managers 
2 2 5 9 4 4 
Convenor 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Shop 
Steward 
1 1 2 4 2 2 
HR 
Consultants 
1 1 4 4 2 2 
Supervisors 1 1 4 6 3 3 
Blue-collar 
workers 
4 4 18 18 1 1 
 Total 11 11 40 49 14 14 
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Tab II – GD profile 
 
 
 
 
GD  
Products Electro hydraulic motors 
and controllers for off-
highway machinery 
industry 
Employees worldwide 
(2006) 
9,000 
Employees in Denmark 
(2006) 
2,400 
Revenue (2006) $1,7 billion 
